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LOE V. ARMISTEAD: THE AVAILABILITY OF AN
ALTERNATIVE REMEDY AS A BAR TO EXTENDING BIVENS
In the past two decades the federal courts have served, to a vir-
tually unprecedented degree in our history, as a forum for vindicat-
ing violations of individual freedoms by various levels of govern-
ment.' Yet, not until recently could federal law enforcement officers
be held liable for the results of their tortious conduct. In 1971, the
United States Supreme Court, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 2 held that the victim of an unconstitutional search and
seizure by federal narcotics agents could recover money damages
from the officers on a theory of liability based directly on the fourth
amendment.3 Because the Court employed remarkably broad lan-
guage, further definition and delineation were necessary to create a
workable paradigm for the radical new concept of a "constitutional
tort." Although a detailed framework for analysis is essential to
guide the lower courts confronting similar actions based on other
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of a constitutionally created cause of action in the seven years
since the Bivens decision.4 The lower courts have assumed, by de-
fault, the task of interpreting the ramifications of the Bivens deci-
sion. As a result, the federal common law, which has developed from
1. The number of civil rights suits filed in this country increased from 280 in 1960, to 12,213
in 1977. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 452 (1978) (citing [1960] AD. OFF.
OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 232, table C2, and [1977] AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. CouRTs ANN.
REP. A-14, table C2)).
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3. Id. at 397.
4. Comments have been infrequent and ambiguous. Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 713 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (permitting suit against a municipality under
§ 1983 preferred over implying a constitutional cause of action under Bivens); Laing v. United
States, 423 U.S. 161, 209 n.14 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (cause of action under Bivens
could remedy abuse in tax collection); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 516 (1973)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (city could be sued under Bivens though immune from suit under
§ 1983); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 433 (1973) (dictum) (action against
District of Columbia police officer for constitutional violation cognizable under Bivens);
O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 14 n.7 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting deprivation
of fifteenth amendment right to vote could be remedied under Bivens); United States v.
United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 325 (1972) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (abuse of search incident to arrest actionable under Bivens); Lynch v. Household Fin.
Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547 (1972) (dictum) (discussion of suits against federal officers refers to
"deprivations of constitutional rights" without limiting actions to fourth amendment viola-
tions).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:393
applying Bivens, has been as variegated as if the matter had been
delegated to the individual states. 5
In Loe v. Armistead,' a divided Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit 7 considered whether Bivens should be extended to include
an invasion of a personal interest in liberty protected by the fifth
amendment. The court concluded that, in the absence of a legisla-
tive remedy, such an action could be maintained against the federal
officials responsible for the alleged violation,8 thereby following the
prevailing trend toward expanding Bivens to encompass rights other
than those protected by the fourth amendment.9 This Comment
asserts that the court erred in extending Bivens under the facts of
Loe because an adequate remedy was available to the plaintiff
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).'"
LOE v. ARMISTEAD
In Loe, the plaintiff, a federal prisoner awaiting retrial in a local
jail under a contractual agreement with federal authorities," was
5. See generally Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause
of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531 (1977),
and the cases cited therein; see also Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 807 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978).
6. 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978).
7. Judge Winter wrote the majority opinion in which Judge Butzner joined. Judge Hall
filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1297-98.
8. Id. at 1296.
9. See Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (fourteenth amendment due process);
Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted
sub nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 436 U.S. 943 (1978)
(fifth amendment just compensation clause); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925
(8th Cir. 1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) (fourteenth amendment due process); Dellums
v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3146 (1978) (first amendment
freedom of speech); Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Serv., 521 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1975)
(first amendment freedom of speech); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926
(10th Cir. 1975) (dictum that Bivens is not limited solely to fourth amendment claims);
States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment due
process); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) (fifth amendment
due process). But see Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (damage remedy under
fifth amendment due process judicially unmanageable); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.
1977) (damage remedy under the fourteenth amendment due process clause not available).
The Seventh Circuit refused to expand Bivens to create a cause of action against a munici-
pality under the fourteenth amendment, McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977), but otherwise has indicated that Bivens extends to fourteenth
amendment actions. Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 966 (1976); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2780 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
11. This practice is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1970), which provides:
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injured when he accidentally slipped and fell. He was given pills to
alleviate his pain immediately at the prison infirmary, but as a
federal prisoner he could not be transported to a hospital for further
medical treatment until federal marshals arrived to escort him. 12
Although the local authorities later contended the marshals were
notified the same day, the plaintiff was not taken to the hospital by
the marshals until the next morning; x-rays revealed a fractured
right arm. 13 The complaint alleged that the delay constituted delib-
erate indifference to the plaintiffs serious medical needs and vio-
lated his eighth amendment right to protection against cruel and
unusual punishment. 4 In addition to demanding compensatory and
punitive damages, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment con-
cerning the constitutionality of procedures for transporting federal
prisoners in state facilities to hospitals and an order directing the
adoption of proper procedures to rectify any inadequacies.,5 The
local jail officials and employees, including the treating prison phy-
sician, and the federal marshals were named as defendants. 6 The
district court summarily dismissed the suit for failure to state a
For the purpose of providing suitable quarters for the safekeeping, care, and
subsistence of all persons held under authority of any enactment of Congress,
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons may contract, for a period not exceeding
three years, with the proper authorities of any State, Territory, or political
subdivision thereof, for the imprisonment, subsistence, care, and proper em-
ployment of such persons.
12. 582 F.2d at 1292.
13. Id. at 1293.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
15. 582 F.2d at 1293.
16. Other claims, not relevant to this inquiry, charged the local jailers with failure to
provide prompt medical care for the plaintiff's injured arm after he returned to jail following
a trip out of state for psychiatric treatment, as well as charges against the accompanying
marshals. The dismissal of these claims was affirmed by the court of appeals. Id. at 1297.
All claims against the local defendants were brought under a provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Both the majority in Loe and the dissent implied that a cause of action against federal
officials could be grounded on § 1983. 582 F.2d at 1296 n.3, 1297. Whether these comments
were seriously intended or simply an oversight, they are clearly erroneous; federal officials
cannot be sued under § 1983. Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1061 (1972).
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claim upon which relief could be granted. 7 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit reversed and remanded the claim with regard to the initial
treatment of the broken arm. 8
Judge Winter, writing for the majority, noted that the conduct of
the local prison authorities was linked inextricably to the conduct
of the federal marshals; therefore, the court initially had to decide
whether an action could be maintained against the marshals named
in the complaint. 9 The court's analysis involved three basic ques-
tions. The court first examined whether the complaint alleged a
violation of a federally protected right." The court answered this
inquiry in the affirmative. Although the complaint asserted that the
conduct constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the eighth amendment, the court decided that the plaintiff's status
as a federal pretrial-detainee made the due process clause of the
fifth amendment a more appropriate basis for relief.21 The court
avoided defining the scope of this due process protection by noting
17. 582 F.2d at 1292.
18. Id. at 1297.
19. Id. at 1293.
20. Id. at 1293-94.
21. The court noted that pretrial-detainees, because they have been convicted of no crime,
may be subjected only to such restrictions as are reasonably necessary to ensure their presence
at trial. See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial
Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970). Any restriction that exceeds these bounds violates the
detainee's right to due process. This reasoning, however, is not relevant to the instant case.
Three of the cases cited by the court deal with general prison conditions for pretrial-detainees
as a class distinct from prisoners actually convicted. Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir.
1976); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.
1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974). Loe is distinguishable on the basis that
it concerns the individual act or omission of a few persons, rather than general prison policy.
The fourth case cited, Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972), although brought by
a pretrial detainee, does not focus on the plaintiff's status in the decision.
Why the court chose to adopt the Second Circuit's position that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause is not applicable to a prisoner until after conviction and sentencing, Rhem
v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973), is unclear given that other courts have held the eighth amend-
ment directly applicable. E.g., Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 301-03 (E.D. Mo. 1973);
Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 264-65 (D. Md. 1972); cf. Dellums v. Powell, 566
F.2d 216, 227 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3146 (1978) (for convenience,
referring to pretrial detainee's complaint as an eighth amendment claim, but not resolving
the issue).
The eighth amendment also contains a prohibition against excessive bail, which obviously
could be applicable only to pretrial detainees. Possibly, the court, having previously recog-
nized a Bivens cause of action under the fifth amendment in States Marine Lines, Inc. v.
Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974), felt more secure following precedent than in extending
Bivens to eighth amendment violations.
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that it was "at least as co-extensive as the guarantees of the eighth
amendment" 22 and that the allegations were sufficient under the
eighth amendment to avoid summary dismissal? 3
The court then addressed whether the alleged violation justified
extending Bivens to provide a damage remedy for invasion of the
fifth amendment's protection of personal interest in liberty.u Find-
ing no explicit declaration against granting monetary relief to one
whose due process rights have been violated, and considering that
the injury alleged was one for which damages normally would be
appropriate, the court concluded that an action against the mar-
shals could be maintained because Congress had provided no other
remedy. 25 The court noted that in a recent decision, Davis v.
Passman,'2 the Fifth Circuit had refused to extend Bivens to include
fifth amendment violations, but it characterized the decision as
mistakenly premised on a superfluous concern that a deluge of new
litigation might result and as inconsistent with prior decisions of the
Fourth Circuit.27
This characterization, however, was not a fair recitation of the
Passman holding. In Passman the court considered whether a con-
gressman who dismissed his administrative assistant on the basis of
sex could be sued under a Bivens claim for violation of the woman's
right to due process protected by the fifth amendment.2 Construing
Bivens to suggest that an implied cause of action was not wholly of
constitutional dimensions, the court concluded that it must con-
sider both the intent of Congress and the necessity of a damage
remedy to vindicate the right asserted.29 Congress had provided ex-
tensive remedies for various kinds of federal employees but pur-
posely had excluded those persons like the plaintiff in noncompeti-
tive jobs .3 This exclusion was viewed by the court as an explicit
expression of congressional intent to deny protection to this category
22. 582 F.2d at 1294.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1294-95.
25. Id. at 1294.
26. 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978).
27. 582 F.2d at 1294 n.2.
28. 571 F.2d at 795.
29. Id. at 797.
30. 42 U.S.C. 2000c-16(a) (Supp. V 1975). The statute under which the plaintiff had been
hired provided that members of a congressman's personal staff are removable "at any time
. ..with or without cause." 2 id. § 92 (1970).
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of federal employees.' In addition, the court in Passman asserted
that, given the breadth of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, to expand Bivens protection to include due process rights
would have the effect of condoning an action for damages based on
any constitutional violation." This concern was reflected in the
statement regarding the potential impact that recognition of a due
process cause of action would have on the volume of litigation in
federal courts.3 Although equitable relief was not available to the
plaintiff because the defendant was no longer in office, the court
refused to create a cause of action where Congress had declined to
provide one.34 Unlike the court in Loe, the Fifth Circuit chose to
emphasize the importance of legislative intent as a determinative
factor; the analysis is consistent with recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements that imply causes of action from statutes.3 5
The Fourth Circuit's final inquiry was whether the allegations in
the complaint were sufficient to state a cognizable claim. Relying
primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Gamble,3
which held that a prisoner who alleged acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to indicate deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
had stated a cognizable claim under the eighth amendment,37 the
31. 571 F.2d at 800.
32. Id. at 797. The court noted that "[t]he concept of due process encompasses virtually
all of the civil liberties derived from the Constitution." Id. The court also stated that
"[b]ecause of the breadth of due process, a decision implying an action for money damages
from the fifth amendment Due Process Clause alone would extend an action for damages to
any constitutional guarantee." Id. at 799-800.
33. Id. at 800.
34. Id.
35. Legislative intent and the consistency of congressional purpose behind the statute has
been determinative in a number of recent cases. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975);
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). Given that two of the five
members who voted with the majority in Bivens are no longer on the Court, this trend could
reflect a disinclination to favor unlimited expansion of the Bivens doctrine. See note 45 infra.
36. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). This case involved an inmate who was injured in a state prison and,
complaining of the medical treatment he received, brought a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
37. Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion, which held that
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" proscribed by the Eighth Amend-
ment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in
their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally deny-
ing or delaying access to medical care . . . .Regardless of how evidenced,
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court found that the unusually long delay between the injury and
the treatment the next day at the hospital raised an issue as to
whether some or all of the defendants deliberately were indifferent
to the plaintiff's medical needs. 8 The court concluded, therefore,
that the complaint stated a cause of action and remanded the case
to the district court for consideration of the merits. 9
Judge Hall dissented on the ground that the creation of a Bivens
action for an alleged violation of a due process right was unnecessary
based on the facts in the complaint." He asserted that the creation
of such an action would serve only to overburden the federal courts
with a flood of unmeritorious claims, particularly by federal prison-
ers who could find some official to sue for violation of the plethora
of possible rights encompassed by the fifth amendment due process
clause.4 '
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Loe reflects the same analytical
problems that characterize other lower court decisions applying
Bivens. The lack of a clear analytical formula has generated a range
of inconsistent holdings, with one court asserting that Bivens is
limited to fourth amendment actions against officers 2 and others
reading it as "sweeping approbation of constitutionally-based
causes of action."43 Moreover, by focusing on whether a remedy had
been provided to compensate the denial of the constitutional right,
the court in Loe failed to recognize that a remedial scheme had been
created to compensate a federal prisoner injured while incarcer-
ated.44
deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of
action under § 1983.
429 U.S. at 104-05 (citations and footnotes omitted). The Court also noted that allegations
of deliberate indifference are essential to raise the injury to the level of a constitutional
violation; mere malpractice would not be sufficient. Id. at 105-06, 106 n.14.
38. 582 F.2d at 1296. The court expressed no view on the merits of Loe's claim. Id.
39. Id. at 1296-97.
40. Id. at 1297-98.
41. Id. at 1298. Judge Hall noted caustically that the danger of unmeritorious claims was
fully evident in the case at bar, considering that the plaintiff had filed twelve cases in the
district court and taken seven appeals to the Fourth Circuit. Id. at n.1.
42. Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D. Va. 1972); accord, Archuleta v. Calla-
way, 385 F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Colo. 1974); Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D.
Colo. 1974); Smothers v. CBS; 351 F. Supp. 622, 626 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
43. Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 734 (2d Cir. 1975); see Turpin v. Mailet, 579
F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978).
44. See text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
In Bivens, the Supreme Court45 held in a divided opinion that
federal officers could be sued for damages for violation of fourth
amendment rights.46 The case involved a peculiar fact situation
which, if proved true, would have left the victim with no sufficient
remedy for the injuries he suffered at the hands of federal investiga-
tors.47 Although the Civil Rights Act of 187148 provides for a cause
of action against persons who violate a citizen's constitutional
rights, this section 1983 remedy is applicable only if the persons are
acting under color of state law. The Federal Tort Claims Act49 of-
fered no protection because at that time the United States was
immune from suit for intentional torts committed by federal em-
ployees." Likewise, another judicially created remedy for fourth
amendment violations, the exclusionary rule, was inapplicable be-
cause Bivens was never charged with a crime.' Consequently, the
Court concluded that a remedy could be provided to the plaintiff
only by implying a cause of action directly from the fourth amend-
ment.
52
45. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
Douglas, Stewart, White and Marshall. Justice Harlan wrote a lengthy concurring opinion.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun each wrote dissenting opinions.
46. Id. at 397.
47. A cause of action could have been implied if the agents violated a criminal statute that
protects a federal right. See Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). See
generally 77 HARV. L. REv. 285 (1963). Criminal penalties may be enforced against federal
law enforcement officers who illegally search a private dwelling. 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1970).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For the text of this provision, see note 16 supra.
49. See note 10 supra.
50. When Bivens was decided, the FTCA specifically excepted from coverage all claims
"arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) (amended 1974). A number of intentional torts are not listed among
the exceptions and are, therefore, cognizable under the FTCA, because the courts tend to
interpret the list as inclusive. Thus, a number of successful suits against the United States
have been based on theories not enumerated in the list of exceptions. Hatahley v. United
States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956) (trespass); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 276 F.
Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), affl'd, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (trespass); United States v. Ein
Chem. Corp., 161 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (conversion). The plaintiff in Bivens could
have advanced a claim based on the FTCA against the United States on theories of invasion
of privacy or trespass. The legislative history of the 1974 amendment indicates congressional
approval of such actions. S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2791 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 5881.
51. 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. Id. The Court was unwilling to consider the actions that might have been available on
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The Court's decision in Bivens was premised on two assumptiohs.
"[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, . . . courts
will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief. ' 53 The Court also recognized that money damages historically
have been the common remedy for invasions of personal liberty. 4
Unlike the broad concept of due process involved in Lae, the
violation of the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures involved a more narrow right for which the
Court had evolved a set of specific guidelines to govern police con-
duct.55 The warrantless search and arrest alleged in Bivens was
made without probable cause and clearly violated established judi-
cial strictures governing such activity." The Court concluded that,
in the absence of either an alternative remedial scheme enacted by
Congress to enforce the constitutional right violated, or other
"special factors counseling hesitation," 7 the remedy of money dam-
ages was necessary to enforce the commands of the fourth amend-
ment. 51 Because Congress had not prohibited explicitly recovery by
persons injured by illegal police conduct, the petitioner was entitled
to redress his injuries in federal court in a damage action based
directly on the fourth amendment. 9
a state level against the wrongdoers, on the grounds that the laws might "be inconsistent or
even hostile." Id. at 394. Because of the diversity of opinions interpreting Bivens in the lower
courts, the same problem seems to be eroding the utility of Bivens. See notes 5, 9 & 42-43
supra & accompanying text.
53. Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). Ironically, this often-quoted
passage was written by Justice Black, who dissented in Bivens. Id. at 427-30.
54. Id. at 395.
55. Court interpretations of the constitutional requirements of the fourth amendment are
legion. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (establishing restrictions on the
scope of a search of the premises incident to arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 794 (1967)
(warrantless search of a dwelling justified when police in "hot pursuit"); Schmerber v. United
States, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (specifying what items may be searched for in a lawful search of
a dwelling); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (establishing certain situations
where warrantless searches of dwelling are justified); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948) (emergency requiring immediate action can be basis for warrantless search of a
dwelling). See also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (defines a "dwelling" under the
fourth amendment); United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964) (defines "curtilage"
of the dwelling).
56. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAlv. L. Rv.
1532, 1534 (1972).
57. 403 U.S. at 396.
58. Id. at 397. Justice Harlan noted: "For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or noth-
ing." Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
59. Id.
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The persuasive simplicity of the Court's reasoning has made
Bivens difficult to apply with any consistency. Several observations,
however, are worthy of note. The Supreme Court appeared to sug-
gest that Congress is the primary source of remedies for constitu-
tional violations and, that in the absence of congressional action,
the Court should imply such remedies only where necessary or oth-
erwise appropriate. 0 Because the Court focused on the constitu-
tional dimensions of the wrongful conduct, however, the fact that a
common law analogue in tort also may exist became obscured and
often is overlooked. Lower court decisions that likewise have focused
on the constitutional dimensions of the torts have ignored Congress'
explicit answer to wrongs such as that which occurred in Bivens: the
intentional torts amendment to the FTCA, which is couched in
common law tort terms." Moreover, unlike traditional common law
torts, which have specific prima facie elements that must be
pleaded and proved, constitutional torts are broader in scope; the
due process clause, for example, is so fluid as to defy precise defini-
tion.12 The recognition given a cause of action predicated upon a
deprivation of property under the due process clause could extend,
by incorporation, to all claims based on any of the civil liberties
encompassed by that right, or it merely might authorize future deci-
sions on a case-by-case basis. Finally, Bivens provides no rigid anal-
ysis for determining which constitutional rights demand money
damages and which do not; nor does it articulate which factors
courts should focus on in recognizing a Bivens action. In Loe, one
of the factors relied on by the court in recognizing a cause of action
based on the fifth amendment was its previous recognition of such
an action, 3 even though the earlier case involved property interests64
while Loe dealt with personal interests in liberty.
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A cause of action based directly on the violation of constitutional
60. See id. at 397. The "necessary" or "appropriate" standard has been applied by lower
courts in considering whether Bivens should be extended to other constitutional rights. See,
e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 902
(1978); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1157 (4th Cir. 1974).
61. See notes 68-69 infra & accompanying text.
62. See note 32 supra.
63. States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 1147. Shultz dealt with whether the plaintiff-shipping lines could recover dam-
ages for cargo seized by customs agents without a warrant. Id.
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rights is essentially a judicial tool to be used only in those circum-
stances in which the injured plaintiff has no other federal remedy
available. The courts should defer to the remedial scheme provided
by Congress for alleged wrongful conduct regardless of whether that
remedy is designed to protect the specific constitutional right
claimed to have been violated." In Loe, such a remedy was available
in the Federal Tort Claims Act, which provides that a person in-
jured by the act of a federal employee may bring suit directly
against the United States. The Act recognizes claims based on
negligence, and, if the tortfeasor is a federal investigative officer,
claims for intentional misconduct."
Three years after Bivens, in response to that decision and to a
series of highly publicized illegal searches and seizures by federal
narcotics officers,"7 Congress passed a major amendment to the
FTCA.6 5 The amendment waives the defense of sovereign immunity
and makes the United States independently liable for intentional
torts committed by federal law enforcement agents, defined as "any
officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Fed-
eral law."6 9 Reflected in the legislative history of the amendment is
65. By focusing on the right violated, the injury suffered tends to be overlooked. If that
injury can be compensated within the existing remedial framework provided by Congress,
then, accordingly, the violation of the victim's constitutional right has been redressed. To
ignore this rationale would condone an entirely new set of judicially created collateral reme-
dies, to the exclusion of those provided by Congress, because a constitutional right allegedly
has been violated.
66. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
67. These incidents are detailed in S. REP. No. 469, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29-32 (1973)
(individual views of Senator Percy). See also Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The Federal Tort
Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. REV. 497,
500-07 (1976).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. V. 1975) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970)). The
amendment became effective on March 16, 1974. It supplements § 2680(h) as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to-
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false ar-
rest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts
or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States
Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
apply to any claim arising, on or after the enactment of this proviso, out of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
prosecution.
69. Id.
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Congress' skepticism whether the remedy afforded by Bivens to
victims of law enforcement abuses was satisfactory. Because the
agents responsible were likely to be judgment-proof, the amend-
ment was considered a more viable alternative to assure recovery. 0
This affirmative action by Congress creating a remedy for exactly
the type of conduct alleged in Bivens represents one of the "special
factors counseling hesitation" absent in the Bivens case, and is, in
fact, a direct response to that omission.
The FTCA and the Federal Prisoner
Congress has enacted two pieces of legislation that together create
a pervasive regulatory scheme protecting injured federal prisoners."
The Federal Prison Industries Fund" provides a remedy to federal
prisoners injured while performing assigned prison tasks.13 If the
prisoner is not engaged in prison industries at the time the injury is
sustained, he may recover under the FTCA. 4
70. S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [19731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2789, 2790. Congress undoubtedly was aware of the widespread criticism that the
effectiveness of § 1983 was similarly limited because the individual officials often were
judgment-proof and because, at that time, under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
municipalities could not be held liable under § 1983. This limitation was one of the primary
arguments for extending liability under Bivens to municipalities, which are more attractive
defendants. See Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70
Nw. U. L. REv. 770 (1975); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional
Violations, 89 HARV. L. REv. 922 (1976); Comment, Implying a Damage Remedy Against
Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Congressional Action as an Ob-
stacle to Extension of the Bivens Doctrine, 36 MD. L. Rv. 123 (1976). This problem has been
resolved in Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which overruled
Monroe and held that local governments are not wholly immune from suit under § 1983. Id.
at 663.
71. Existing statutory law concerning federal prisoners reference herein makes no distinc-
tion between pretrial-detainees and convicted prisoners. Typically, the statutes refer only to
those "charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States, or held as witnesses
or otherwise." 18 U.S.C. § 4042(2) (1970). Except as otherwise noted, the term "prisoner" in
the text includes both pretrial-detainees and convicted prisoners.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970). This statute creates a fund that is set aside in part to compen-
sate inmates "for injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with
the maintenance or operation of the institution where confined." Id. Recovery under this
statute is the exclusive remedy available for such injuries, and a prisoner injured while
performing an assigned prison task is barred from suing under the FTCA. United States v.
Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966). See generally Annot., 17 L. ED. 2d 929 (1967).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970).
74. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). The Supreme Court held that the absence
of an express exclusion of prisoners' claims by Congress indicated a deliberate choice to
include such persons within the ambit of the FTCA. Id. at 156-58; See Garza v. United States,
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The Supreme Court, in Logue v. United States,75 confronted the
issue of the government's liability under the FTCA to a federal
pretrial-detainee incarcerated in a local jail under a lease agreement
while awaiting trial.71 In Logue, a prisoner with a history of suicidal
tendencies killed himself while unattended in his cell.77 The Court
found that the United States was insulated from liability under the
FTCA for the negligent acts or omissions of the local prison officials
because in such circumstances the local officials are independent
contractors.78 To subject the United States to liability, the prisoner
must establish that his injury occurred as a result of the conduct of
a federal employee, as distinguished from that of an employee of the
local jail.79
The allegations in Loe's complaint asserted that the federal mar-
shals' deliberate indifference to his medical needs subjected him to
cruel and unusual punishment." The federal marshals qualify as
investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States under
the FTCA intentional torts amendment.' Therefore, based on the
allegations in the complaint, Loe would have a cause of action
against the marshals under the FTCA on a theory of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.2 Alternatively, should he be unable
to prove the necessary intent on the part of the officers, he could
recover on a negligence theory under the FTCA.3 Congress has im-
413. F. Supp. 23 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Williams v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C.
1974); Bourgeois v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Lawrence v. United
States, 193 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Ala. 1961). See generally L. JAYsoN, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 160 (1977); Annot., 10 L. ED. 2d 1361 (1963).
75. 412 U.S. 521 (1972).
76. Id. at 523.
77. Id. at 524-25.
78, Id. at 530-32.
79. Id. at 526.
80. See notes 11-14 supra & accompanying text.
81. Lucas v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 539 (D.D.C. 1977).
82. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is not one of the intentional tort actions
specifically enumerated in the 1974 amendment to the FTCA. For the text of the amendment,
see note 68 supra. However, because such an action has not been exempted explicitly from
liability under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), and because courts generally have assumed, in the
absence of contrary legislative intent, that the list is comprehensive, see note 50 supra, a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is cognizable under the FTCA.
Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1977). In addition, the law of the state where
the wrongful act takes place governs for actions brought under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b) (1970), and the tort of outrage has been recognized in Virginia in Womack v. Eld-
ridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 (1965).
83. The FTCA was intended originally to provide remedies for victims of the negligent acts
- 1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:393
posed by statute a duty on the federal government to protect and
care for all prisoners convicted of or charged with crimes against the
United States.84 If federal officers negligently breach that duty, the
Supreme Court has held that the injured party has a cause of action
under the FTCA.85
Lower courts have construed a cause of action under the FTCA
to be the exclusive remedy and, therefore, to preclude an action
against the federal employees individually." Generally, however,
the FTCA is not considered to be the exclusive remedy available to
the injured plaintiff except in the limited circumstances specified
by statute. The Justice Department, moreover, had suggested that
the draft of the intentional torts amendment be changed to provide
an exclusive remedy against the United States."' The question un-
answered by Bivens and raised by Loe is not whether an action can
be maintained simultaneously against the individual wrongdoers
of governmental employees. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1970). This statute provides in appropriate parts that:
The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, shall-
(2) provide suitable quarters and provide for the safekeeping, care, and
subsistence of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the
United States, or held as witnesses or otherwise;
(3) provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons
charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States.
The special relationship existing between the jailer and his prisoner generally has been
recognized in tort law as imposing a duty of due care on the jailer. See Ricketts v. Ciccone,
371 F. Supp. 1249 (W.D. Mo. 1974); Farmer v. State ex rel. Russell, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So.2d
528 (1958); Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962).
85. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 525 (1972); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S.
150 (1963).
86. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963), and Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966)).
Although these cases refer only to negligence actions, the same analysis would be applicable
to intentional torts under the FTCA.
87. The remedy against the United States is exclusive with regard to: (1) claims against
government agencies, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (1970); (2) claims arising out of the operation of
motor vehicles on official business, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1970); and (3) malpractice claims
against physicians, dentists, nurses, and certain other medical personnel employed by the
government, 38 U.S.C. § 4116(a) (Supp. V 1975); 42 id. § 233(a). The complaint in Loe
contained a number of allegations that would appear to be actionable as medical malpractice
claims. The doctor that treated Loe is an employee of the local prison, however, and cannot
be sued under the FTCA. See note 78 supra & accompanying text. Also, a malpractice action
is not actionable under § 1983. See note 119 infra.
88. Undated draft of a Department of Justice bill, cited in Boger, Giteristein & Verkuil,
supra note 67. at 512.
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and the United States; such an action always has been permitted. 9
The real issue in Loe is whether the courts can create a new cause
of action based on a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights
if Congress expressly has provided a remedy that derives directly
from the defendant's conduct.
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES: BIVENS vs. THE FTCA
A comparison of the two alternative remedies affords an oppor-
tunity to evaluate the necessity and appropriateness of the judi-
cially created remedy under the particular facts of Loe. Examina-
tion of the key features of the FTCA and the corresponding elements
of a Bivens claim reveals that the FTCA action is preferable. The
important differences appear in provisions for administrative settle-
ment, proper defendants, defenses, punitive damages, and equita-
ble relief.
Administrative Settlement
The FTCA does not require any minimum amount to be put in
controversy,9" although each claim must be submitted to the appro-
priate federal agency for administrative settlement before a remedy
can be pursued in the courts.9 ' Similarly, under a Bivens cause of
action a recent amendment to the jurisdictional requirements for
federal courts waived the $10,000 minimum requirement for cases
involving the United States, including those brought against any
federal employee action in an official capacity. 2 An attempt at
89. See generally L. JAYSON, supra note 74, at § i78.02 (points out that the federal employee
who causes the injury is answerable primarily in tort and the government's liability, based
on respondant superior, is derivative); see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693-94 (1949); Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035, 1043 (D.
Hawaii 1973). Although the FTCA has never been viewed as a bar to an action against the
employee, judgment in an FTCA action is a complete bar to an action against the individual
government agent. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1970). See also Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note
67, at 537.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1970).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1970). If suit is filed before an administrative claim has been submit-
ted, dismissal is appropriate on jurisdictional grounds. Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of
Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975); Altman v. Connally, 456 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1972);
Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971). See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED.
762 (1972). This requirement applies equally to suits filed by federal prisoners. Mayo v.
United States, 407 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Va. 1976).
92. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (1976). This section eliminates the requirement of any specific
amount in controversy if the action is brought against the United States, any federal agency,
197.81
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administrative settlement, however, need not precede an action
under Bivens. 3 Public policy, which encourages out-of-court settle-
ments, would be served better by an action under the FTCA. In
addition, those who have expressed fears of a possible deluge of new
suits in federal courts would be somewhat pacificed by a remedy
that offers the opportunity of administrative settlement.
Defendants
FTCA actions are limited to suits against the federal government
and create no cause of action against the employees individually.94
Bivens, however, allows an action against the individual offenders
but not against the United States, the latter being immune from
suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 5 At least one com-
mentator, recognizing that the doctrine has no constitutional basis,
has suggested that the immunity could be abrogated judicially
under appropriate circumstances.96 The Supreme Court, however,
when offered the opportunity to do so in Bivens, showed no such
propensity.97 Thus, a plaintiff in a Bivens-type claim may recover
only against the individual defendants, who are least likely to be
able to satisfy a judgment. If brought under the FTCA, Loe's claim
should not be prejudiced by the exclusion of the individuals from
liability under that Act because the United States is obviously a
or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity. The previous $10,000 minimum
amount in controversy was viewed as the major deterrent to frivolous or insubstantial claims
in federal courts. See. e.g.. Arnold v. Troccoli, 344 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1965). The removal
of this bar will increase the concern of those who feared that Bivens could open the floodgates
to a myriad of new suits in federal courts. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 403
U.S. 388, 430 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1298 (4th
Cir. 1978) (Hall. J.. dissenting).
93. Where, however, the government's misconduct is particularly blatant and potentially
embarassing, an effort by the agency to quiet the controversy may be made, but the offer is
likely to be unsatisfactory and limited to property damage. See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil,
supra note 67. at 504 nn. 28 & 29.
94. See United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954); Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d
951 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lushbough, 200 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1952); Crain v.
Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Turner v. Ralston, 409 F. Supp. 1260 (W.D.
Wis. 1976).
95. See generally Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039
(1926-1927) (pts. 4-6); Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229
(1924-1925) (pts. 1-3): Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 HAmV. L. REv. 1 (1963); see also Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
96. Dellinger. supra note 56, at 1556-57 (1972).
97. 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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more attractive defendant." As noted earlier, one reason for -the
intentional torts amendment to the FTCA was congressional con-
cern that because the individual agents were usually judgment-
proof, the plaintiff had little chance of recovery.9
Defenses
Under Bivens, a defense of qualified immunity is available to the
federal marshals contingent upon their ability to show that they
acted in good faith and that they reasonably believed that their
conduct was lawful."' Once established, the defense is a complete
bar to their monetary liability. Although few courts have inter-
preted the liability of the United States under the new FTCA
amendment, a recent decision in the Fourth Circuit, Norton v.
United States, "' held that the United States could assert the good-
faith defense of its agents. 10 This holding is highly suspect and
seems to contradict the legislative history of the amendment.0 3 Two
other defenses, however, are available to the government under the
FTCA. Section 2680(a) excludes all claims based upon any act or
omission of a government employee either exercising due care or
98. In Bivens the Supreme Court seemed more concerned with providing the plaintiff a
remedy than with the adequacy of the remedy itself, given that the names of the defendants
were not known by the plaintiff. Also, the likelihood of recovery was diminished by the Second
Circuit's decision on remand to allow the agents to assert a qualified immunity defense.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
99. See note 70 supra & accompanying text.
100. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972); accord,
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 659 n. 215 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976); Tritsis v. Backer, 501 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1974); States Marine Lines, Inc. v.
Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1158 (4th Cir. 1974); Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 145 (E.D.
Va. 1977), reo'd on other grounds sub nom. Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.
1978); Sparrow v. Goodman, 361 F. Supp. 566, 586 (W.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Rowley
v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974).
101. 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978).
102. Id. at 397.
103. The Fourth Circuit was unwilling to consider a Senate Memorandum of which it did
not have a copy, id. at 396 n.11, but which was quoted in a law review article referred to by
the plaintiff. The memorandum explicitly stated:
Congress does not oppose, however, the assertion of defenses of good faith and
reasonable belief in the validity of the search and arrest on behalf of individual
government defendants, so long as it is understood that the government's liabil-
ity is not co-terminous [sic] with that of the individual defendants.
Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, Memorandum on No-Knock Legislation, Aug. 28, 1973,
at 5, quoted in Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 67, at 515.
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performing a discretionary function. '"4 Neither of these defenses
would bar recovery under the FTCA for conduct such as that alleged
in Loe, involving deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are not recoverable under the FTCA.05 This
factor ordinarily would be significant in suits in which the inten-
tional harm alleged is an affront to personal dignity rather than any
physical injury. In Loe, however, the importance of punitive dam-
ages is diminished in two respects. First, although the availability
of punitive damages under Bivens is unsettled, Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion, which asserts that the victim "is entitled to
recover money damages for any injuries he had suffered as a result
of the agent's violations," ' 6 has been interpreted to disallow puni-
tive damages for Bivens actions.0 7 Similarly, a recent Supreme
Court decision, Carey v. Piphus, "I arising out of a civil rights claim
brought under section 1983,10 denied recovery of punitive damages
and held that in the absence of proof of actual injury, the litigant
could recover only nominal damages."' Citing Bivens, the Court
stated that the cardinal principle governing the award of damages
in cases involving the violation of constitutional rights is that of
compensating the victim for the injury caused by the defendant's
breach of duty."'
The second factor minimizing the importance of punitive dam-
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970); see Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956) (due
care); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (discretionary function).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2674; Lucas v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 539, 541 n.1 (D.D.C. 1977).
106. 403 U.S. at 397. Punitive damages generally are justified on the basis that they deter
antisocial conduct. Justice Harlan stated in his concurrence, however, that compensating the
victim for the invasion of his constitutional rights is the overriding concern, even if the result
has no effect on deterring future illegal conduct. Id. at 408.
107. Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975). But
see Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975); Patterson v. City of Chester, 389 F.
Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
108. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
109. See note 16 supra.
110. 435 U.S. at 248.
111. Id. at 255. The Court stated in dictum that under certain circumstances punitive
damages may be awarded with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing the violation of
constitutional rights. Id. at 257 n.11. The Court seemed to suggest, however, that malicious
intent to violate constitutional rights would have to be demonstrated. Id. Whether the wrong-
doer would have to intend specifically to violate a constitutional right or only intend the
conduct that results in such a violation is unclear.
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ages in Loe is the situation of the defendants themselves. As noted
above, the individual federal agents are often judgment-proof, and
the chances of receiving substantial punitive damages are mini-
mal,1 2 particularly if the defendant demands a jury trial. The his-
tory of section 1983 civil rights' actions indicates that juries are
unsympathetic toward federal prisoners suing law enforcement offi-
cials, especially if the award of substantial damages would threaten
the officials' livelihood."' FTCA actions, in contrast, must be tried
by the court; a jury trial is not an option available in an action
against the United States."'
Equitable Relief
The one significant obstacle to Loe's claim if asserted under the
FTCA appears to be the unavailability of equitable relief. The
plaintiff requested both a declaratory judgment on the constitution-
ality of federal procedures for transporting federal prisoners from
local jails to hospitals and an injunction mandating the adoption of
procedures to ensure adequate care in the future."15 Declaratory re-
lief apparently is available under the FTCA on the grounds that "if
the basic claim is within the coverage of the Tort Claims Act, a suit
for declaratory judgment is simply a procedural step toward the
ultimate determination of a claim for money damages.""' Injunc-
tive relief, which is available under Bivens, "I may not be pursued
under the FTCA."8 The plaintiff in Loe would not be prejudiced,
however, if barred from injunctive relief because if he succeeds in
proving the unconstitutionality of the existing procedures, changes
necessary to make those procedures comply with constitutional
standards would naturally follow, thereby eliminating the need for
additional injunctive relief.
112. See note 70 supra & accompanying text.
113. See Newman, supra note 1, at 455-58.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1954); United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 701 n.10 (1961).
115. See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
116. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 74, at § 211.02.
117. Some courts erroneously have read Bivens to provide, for the first time, equitable
remedies against federal officials acting unconstitutionally. See Lehmann, supra note 5, at
562 n.203, and the cases cited therein. Federal courts long have exercised their equitable
powers, as evidenced by the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 409 F.2d 718, 723-24 (2d Cir. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
118. Moon v. Takisaki, 501 F.2d 389, 390 (9th Cir. 1974); see Hatahley v. United States,
351 U.S. 173, 182 (1956).
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FTCA As THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
As the preceding discussion indicates, the plaintiff in Loe had
access to a congressionally authorized remedy similar to that pro-
vided by Bivens. Recognition of negligence liability under the FTCA
would have provided a wider range of options than Loe had under
Bivens or in a comparable civil rights action under section 1983.1"9
Language in Bivens suggests that if a similar remedy had been
available to the plaintiff, the outcome might have been different.
Yet one of the anomalies of the constitutional tort concept is that
its primary focus is protection of the right violated by compensating
the victim, using concepts that are imprecise and alien to the main-
stream of traditional tort law. Although the conduct involved may
be defined by both common law tort concepts and rights guaranteed
by the Constitution, Bivens, in effect, recognizes the latter without
reference to the former. The inevitable result is that congressionally
provided remedies, incorporating common law tort concepts and
intended to compensate invasions of federally protected rights, are
ignored in favor of a collateral remedy created by the judiciary.
Such an approach to judicially created remedies is fraught with
hazards. Congress has access to a wider range of remedial tech-
niques than the courts and to an administrative machinery better
suited to deal with essentially legislative functions. Congressional
remedies are developed to handle the general problem rather than
a particular fact situation. When the courts assume a legislative
role, the results are colored by the limitations inherent in the adver-
sary system particularly the tendency to limit possible solutions to
those presented by the opposing parties. Neither party in Loe raised
the possibility of a solution under the FTCA, though it would have
benefited both to do so. 1 0 Arguably, therefore, the court had no duty
to raise the issue on its own initiative. But when the court seeks to
create a previously unrecognized cause of action, it is obligated to
evaluate all the possible alternatives before deciding whether the
exigencies of the situation warrant such a remedy. If the wrong that
119. Negligence is not actionable under § 1983. Bass v. Sullivan, 550 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 (1977); Mathis v. DiGiacinto, 430 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Stokes v. Hurdle. 393 F. Supp. 757 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd sub noma. Stokes v. Brown 535 F.2d
1250 (4th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Wendell, 390 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
120. Defendants, since they were being sued individually in their official capacity, could
have impleaded the United States under the FTCA. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340
U.S. 543 (1954): see Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 67, at 535.
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has injured the plaintiff can be remedied by existing legislative
provisions, the court's inquiry need go no further, regardless of
whether that remedy is aimed specifically at protecting a particular
constitutional right.
Constitutional torts possibly may be considered not inconsistent
with but complementary to the FTCA. This view comports with the
spirit of the legislative history of the 1974 intentional torts amend-
ment;' 21 however, certain factors counsel hesitation. First, although
the legislative history reflects an explicit congressional intention to
correct the type of wrong found in Bivens, Congress nonetheless
phrased the amendment in terms of common law, rather than con-
stitutional, torts. 2 2 Had Congress intended to address constitutional
torts, section 1983 could have been amended to include federal law
enforcement officers. The failure of Congress to amend section 1983
could reflect an understanding that Bivens was to be limited to
fourth amendment violations which could be encompassed within
the common law analogues of trespass, invasion of privacy, assault,
battery, and false imprisonment. Congress' decision to waive sover-
eign immunity for intentional conduct only for acts of federal law
enforcement agents likewise reflects a conscious decision to limit the
FTCA to something less than all constitutional violations. In addi-
tion, the jurisdictional provision of the FTCA provides that rules of
liability of the state where the incident occurred govern the substan-
tive aspects of the suit.12s The basic test is whether under the same
circumstances a private individual would be liable under state
law. 124 Constitutional torts are based upon federal common law and
have no counterpart on the state level; accordingly, the "private
person" analogy under the FTCA would exclude a Bivens claim
because private persons, by definition, cannot commit constitu-
tional torts.125
121. See S. REP. No. 588, supra note 50.
122. See note 68 supra.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970) provides in part that the United States is liable
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
See also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
125. Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 716 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
The court in Loe erred when it extended Bivens to a fifth amend-
ment due process claim. The plaintiff had access to an adequate
remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act that should have been
pursued in lieu of the constitutional claim. The courts are, of course,
the final arbiters of constitutional guarantees, but the creation of
new judicial remedies should be limited to those occasions in which
Congress either has failed to provide a remedy or has provided one
that is inadequate. This approach preserves the integrity of the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches
without weakening the courts' ability to protect the constitutional
rights they so jealously safeguard.
R.G.S.
